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| − | =Keynote Speakers=
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| − | '''Haroon Meer (Thinkst.com, South-Africa) -- You and your research'''
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| | + | =General Information= |
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| − | Haroon is a well-known security researcher who has recently started his own venture with Thinkst.com, an applied research company. He is also involved with ZACON, a security conference in South-Africa.
| + | * '''Registrations start at 8h30!''' |
| − | Haroon is a frequent speaker at conferences such as Blackhat, Defcon, etc.
| + | * Typically workshops run for 2 consecutive speaking slots (ca. 2 hours), but some of them are even longer |
| | + | * Workshop rooms in the location '''Novotel Ghent (Orval, Chimay, La Trappe)''' are 5 minutes walking from the main venue |
| | + | * Workshop seats are limited. '''Reserved seats get in until 5 min before the workshop. After that it is first come, first in.''' |
| | + | * Read our important instructions on [[how to use SCHED.org]]! |
| | + | * This schedule is subject to change, check back regularly. |
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| − | What does it take to do quality research? What stops you from being a one-hit wonder? Is there an age limit to productive hackery? What are the key ingredients needed and how can you up your chances of doing great work? In a talk unabashedly stolen from far greater minds we hope to answer these questions and discuss their repercussions.
| + | Full schedule of the 0x09 (2017) edition [https://brucon0x092017.sched.com/ https://brucon0x092017.sched.com/] |
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| − | '''Alex Hutton (Verizon Business, United States)'''
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| − | Alex is a principal in the Verizon Business RISK intelligence team and has been one of the driving forces behind the VERIS (Verizon Risk Information Sharing) Framework and their yearly Databreach Investigations Report (DBIR). He is involved with the SIRA podcast and frequently presents on risk management and data-driven security at conferences such as Blackhat and Source.
| + | '''Keynotes:''' |
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| − | '''Jaron Lanier (Microsoft, United States)'''
| + | * Keynote: [[Justine Bone]] - [[The cyber short. A market solution for product safety and corporate governance.]] |
| | + | * Keynote: [[Chris Wysopal]] - [[How hackers changed the security industry and how we need to keep changing it.]] |
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| − | Jaron is a pioneer in the realm of virtual reality and currently works as a principal architect for Microsoft’s Extreme Computing lab. He is the author of the 2010 bestseller “you are not a gadget” and has given talks at conferences around the world on virtual reality and the impact of social networks and web 2.0.
| + | '''Talks:''' |
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| − | '''Due to time constraints Jaron will not be able to attend the conference. Instead we are organizing for him to deliver his keynote talk through a video link. We're still privileged to have Jaron on-board for our 2011 edition!''' | + | * [[Matt Wixey]] - [[See no evil, hear no evil: Hacking invisibly and silently with light and sound]] |
| | + | * [[Balazs Bucsay]] - [[XFLTReaT: a new dimension in tunnelling]] |
| | + | * [[Anna Shirokova]] and [[Veronica Valeros]] - [[Knock Knock... Who's there? admin admin and get in! An overview of the CMS brute-forcing malware landscape.]] |
| | + | * [[Volodymyr Styran]] - [[From Weakest Link to Retaliation Weapon: Building Efficient Anti-Social Engineering Awareness Program]] |
| | + | * [[Sampada Nandedkar]] and [[Rushikesh Nandedkar]] - [[Races, Reaches and Rescues!!! (Race condition vulnerabilities revisited)]] |
| | + | * [[Damien Cauquil]] - [[Weaponizing the BBC Micro:Bit]] |
| | + | * [[Sander Demeester]] - [[Secure channels: Building real world crypto systems]] |
| | + | * Josh Schwartz and John Cramb - [[MEATPISTOL, A Modular Malware Implant Framework]] |
| | + | * [[Gregory Pickett]] - [[Open Source Security Orchestration]] |
| | + | * [[František Střasák]] and Sebastian Garcia- [[Detecting malware even when it is encrypted - Machine Learning for network HTTPS analysis]] |
| | + | * [[Nikhil Mittal]] - [[Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination]] |
| | + | * [[Debasish Mandal]] - [[Browser Exploits? Grab them by the collar!]] |
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| − | =Workshops=
| + | '''Workshops:''' |
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| − | | + | * Benjamin Delpy - Mimikatz workshop |
| − | '''Agnitio: the security code review Swiss army knife (David Rook - Security Ninja)'''
| + | * [[Didier Stevens]] - [[Programming Wireshark With Lua]] |
| − | | + | * [[David Szili]] - [[Getting the Most Out of Windows Event Logs]] |
| − | Its static analysis, but not as we know it
| + | * [[Steven Wierckx]] and [[Andy Deweirt]] - [[Building a cheap, robust, scaling, penetration testing/bug bounty super computer]] |
| − | | + | * [[Swaroop Yermalkar]] - [[Practical iOS App Exploitation and Defense using iGoat]] |
| − | '''Collective Malicious PDF Analysis (Brandon Dixon - x0ner)'''
| + | * [[Sergei Frankoff]] and [[Sean Wilson]] - [[Malware Triage: Malscripts Are The New Exploit Kit]] |
| − | | + | * [[Emmanuel Nicaise]] - [[Jedi's trick to convince your boss and colleagues]] |
| − | Going beyond one sample at a time
| + | * [[Leszek Mis]] - [[May the data stay with you - Network Data Exfiltration Techniques.]] |
| − | | + | * [[Slawomir Jasek]] - [[Hacking Bluetooth Smart locks]] |
| − | '''Script Kiddie Hacking Techniques (Ellen Moar & Colin McLean)'''
| + | * [[Georges Bossert]] and [[Frédéric Guihéry]] - [[Defeating Proprietary Protocols the Smart Way]] |
| − | | + | * [[Anto Joseph]] and [[Clarence Chio]] - [[Practical Machine Learning in InfoSecurity]] |
| − | How a script kiddie can copy and paste their way to effective hacks
| + | * [[Vinnie Vanhoecke]] and Tom Kustermans and Joachim Schäfer - [[Playing with RFID workshop]] |
| − | | + | * [[Yannick Wellens]] - [[Windows malware development: A JMP in the dark]] |
| − | '''The Web Application Hacking Toolchain (Jason Haddix - jhaddix)'''
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| − | web hacking made better
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| − | '''White Hat Shellcode: Not for Exploits (Didier Stevens)'''
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| − | Learn to use shellcode for defense
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| − | '''Enterprise Wi-Fi Worms, Backdoors and Botnets for Fun and Profit (Vivek Ramachandran)'''
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| − | '''Beer brewing (TBD)'''
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| − | '''Lockpicking (TBD)'''
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| − | '''VOIP (TBD)'''
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| − | '''RFID (TBD)'''
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| − | =Presentations=
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| − | ''' Ripping Out Code: Practical Attack Surface Reduction for Open Source Systems (Craig Balding)'''
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| − | This talk is about how the software choices we make (or tacitly accept) on our desktops, have greatly increased our attack surface. In the case of OSS, we'll look at practical metrics for measuring code complexity and attack surface along with a "hall of shame" where some OSS projects you know, use and love will be "weighed in". In "the what you can do about it" section, I'll show ways to bring back simplicity and security through highlighting "lighter options" and ripping out code (for non-programmers).
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| − | '''Abusing Locality in Shared Web Hosting (Nick Nikiforakis - nikifor)'''
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| − | The increasing popularity of the World Wide Web has made more and more individuals and companies to identify the need of acquiring a Web presence. The most common way of acquiring such a presence is through Web hosting companies and the most popular hosting solution is shared Web hosting. In this presentation we investigate the workings of shared Web hosting and we point out the potential lack of session isolation between domains hosted on the same physical server. We present two novel server-side attacks against session storage which target the logic of a Web application instead of specific logged-in users. Due to the lack of isolation, an attacker with a domain under his
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| − | control can force arbitrary sessions to co-located Web applications as well as inspect and edit the contents of their existing active sessions. Using these techniques, an attacker can circumvent authentication mechanisms, elevate his privileges, steal private information and conduct attacks that would be otherwise impossible. Finally, we test the
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| − | applicability of our attacks against common open-source software and evaluate their effectiveness in the presence of
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| − | generic server-side countermeasures.
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| − | '''Botnet Identification and remediation (Barry Irwin)'''
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| − | Modern botnet trends have become increasingly sophisticated both in terms of the techniques used to avoid detection on compromised endpoints, but also in their varied communication channels. The use of IRC as the communications medium of choice for Command & Control (C2) activities has been replaced with sophisticated use of IP and domain fast-fluxing to avoid detection and increase resilience. These techniques largely bypass traditional network security detection and mitigation approaches such as blacklists and intrusion detection systems.
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| − | In the ongoing defence against these networks, a number of novel approaches are presented in order to allow an organisation to perform near realtime analysis of network traffic with very low system load. The intention of these is that an organisation or ISP could use the tools as a means of early identification of compromised hosts participating in the botnet. This paper is comprised of three components, the first two relating to detection mechanism, and the final one providing a console which can be used to tracking and information aggregation.
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| − | The first detection technique utilises passive analysis of DNS traffic collected from the network. Due to its tight integration with the TCP/IP suite, it serves as an ideal transport mechanism for communications. Using a combination of classifiers, a high degree of accuracy is obtained in the identification of fast flux domains, using at most a single DNS packet query. This is in contrast to work done by other researchers which required multiple queries. The detection techniques are tested against sample traffic and it is shown that malicious traffic can be detected with low
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| − | false positive rates. This can be combined with a more heavyweight scoring system which utilises other metadata such as registrar, domain age and ASN data to further support scoring.
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| − | The second component applies a lightweight mathematical classification to observed URLs contained in network traffic. This can either be via a network tap, or integrated into a proxy server solution such as squid. The methods used are able to identify malicious urls with a high degree of accuracy, while maintaining a low false positive rate. This lightweight solutionc an be further supported by active queries relating to target ASN, Domain registrar, and other existing blacklists and dnsbl systems.
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| − | The final component provides a web based management and visualisation system providing integration between the above two classes in order to allow for ease of notification of malicious activity. The anticipated target for theses solutions are Academic networks, ISPs and to a lesser extent corporate networks. The intention being that by providing suitable monitoring and analysis of traffic egressing ones network, re-mediation can be carried out by the organisation closest to the infection – in effect cleaning up ones own back yard. A role that this can play other than the operational one described, is to provide researchers with access to suitable data (either live networks or even malware labs) to have an automated means of identifying potentially malicious activity, with very low resource requirements.
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| − | '''Botnets and Browsers - Brothers in a Ghost Shell (Aditya K Sood)'''
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| − | Browsers exploitation is on rise. Botnets in conjunction with Browser Exploit Packs (BEP's) are becoming the source of incredible malware infections. The exploitation revolves around the manipulation of browser architectures thereby infecting victims at large scale. Malware infection is proliferating day by day. In spite of the new advanced protection features, subverting the infections that happen through browsers and take control of the victim's machine remains an arduous task. Exploit packs and attack toolkits play a critical role in the success of malware infections. Browser Exploit Packs (BEPs) are based on the basic philosophy of exploiting the extensibility of browsers by utilizing the technology and developing a code which should work in line with the browser classes.
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| − | '''iOS Data Protection Internals (Andrey Belenko)'''
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| − | Data protection is a feature available for iOS 4 devices with hardware encryption: iPhone 4, iPhone 3GS, iPod touch (3rd generation or later), and all iPad models. Introduction of this feature had complicated iPhone forensics process because now (almost) all files on user partition are encrypted and physical dumps are of much less value to examiners: while the filesystem seems to be intact, actual file contents are encrypted and are not suitable for analysis. This talk will provide in-depth information about iOS 4 Data protection internals.
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| − | '''The 99¢ heart surgeon dilemma (Stefan Friedli)'''
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| − | Let's assume you need heart sugery. I hope you don't, but let's just stick with it for a minute. How much would you be willing for someone to fix it and who would you hire to do it? If you are a suicidal emo kid, please do not answer, you are ruining the point here. Here's the thing: People want someone suitable and knowledgeable to cut them open and sew them up again and they are willing to pay good money for it. Here are two things you don't want to do:
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| − | 1) You don't want to hire some old drunk with a pocket knife and a sewing kit from the dollar shop which claims to fix your heart for 100 bucks.
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| − | 2) You don't want to hire the same guy for 100'000 bucks when he's wearing a white coat and got shiny high tech tools because the last guy paid in advance...
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| − | What does this have to do with penetration testing? More than we like, unfortunately. I have met companies that invested thousands of dollars, expecting a pentest and getting a spiced up Nessus report as a result. More subtle nuances of "crappy pentest" might overlook essential threats and leave customers at risk with a false sense of security.
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| − | This talk will explore the common mistakes made when performing pentests, which includes the test itself, as well as pre- and post-engagement matters. Also, it applies for testers and customers alike. Also, it might help saving the rainforests.
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| − | '''Pushing in, leaving a present, and pulling out without anybody noticing (Ian Amit)'''
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| − | The industry is saturated with penetration testing experience and have adapted itself to test organizations using "best practice" methodologies over the past decade or so. With not a lot of changes happening in the field, organizations find themselves on the defense with not a lot to account for when data breaches happen.
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| − | In this presentation we will offer an alternative view of how a security test is done, with a strong focus on data exfiltration techniques employed by advanced attackers and criminals. After an overview of how the initial phases of how an attacker would infiltrate a business (common knowledge), we will explore the targeting considerations when choosing what to look after, as well as advanced techniques for getting the data out without being detected.
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| − | Finally, some approaches to data monitoring and control would be proposed in order to mitigate the techniques that are already in place and have affected large organizations.
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| − | '''Social Engineering Like In The Movies (Dale Pearson)'''
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| − | When talking about some of the essential skills of a successful social engineer we regularly discuss body language, the tells of the face and how we can read them, along with how important tonality and commitment are. These are considered common practice, and within the realms of possibility due to popularisation through the media. When we dip our toe further into understanding how the entire body communicates, the secrets of language for manipulating others, all of a sudden it couldn’t be possible, this must be witchcraft.
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| − | '''Smart Phones – The Weak Link in the Security Chain (Nick Walker - tel0seh)'''
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| − | One of the most rapidly advancing aspects of technology today is the mobile phone. Use of a smart phone has become commonplace within both business and society, and many people rely on these devices in their day to day lives. As they increase in both power and functionality, smart phones become both a feasible target and a weapon for an attacker. With these mobile devices having more externally facing services than most other systems, a large attack surface is available. As this talk will show that once compromised, a smart phone of an employee is a deadly tool for breaking in and maintaining a foothold on a corporate network. The talk will demonstrate a multi-staged attack on an non-rooted android handset, running the most common stock firmware versions.
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